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Abstract—Load balancing is currently considered as a 
candidate solution to tackle the emerging problem of 
increasing bandwidth demand in intra-datacenter networks. 
Furthermore, because a short disruption of data transfer 
would corrupt the result of a long procedure of computation, 
fast failure management mechanisms are considered as 
integral part of current datacenters. In this paper, we propose 
a method which uses active probing to detect and manage 
failures in an OpenFlow based datacenter network exploiting 
load balancing among equal cost multiple paths. The proposed 
method is scalable and effective based on the actions it takes 
without involving the controller in the fast failure recovery 
procedure. 
Keywords-SDN; fast failure recovery; load balancing; probe; 
openflow 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In an attempt to increase the network flexibility and 
tractability [1], SDN (Software Defined Networking) was 
born through academic circles. Thereinafter, due to lower 
CAPEX and OPEX [2], it was noticed by large providers as 
a powerful and efficient architecture for carrier grade 
networks. In fact, the main idea is to decouple control plane 
from forwarding plane and transfer it to a central controller. 
By doing so, the controller will have a comprehensive view 
of network and can implement and deploy complex network 
management scenarios, such as failure recovery, and load 
balancing.  
However, similar to other emerging technologies, SDN 
has several major drawbacks; one of which is possibility of 
controller saturation [3] because of numerous requests and 
statistical data it receives in large networks. Accordingly, 
any effort for implementing the aforementioned scenarios 
must be performed by considering this constrain. 
Nowadays, various forms of SDN are emerging for 
carrier grade networks including SR (Segment Routing) [4], 
while the most traditional SDN using OpenFlow [5] 
protocol is suitable for intra-datacenter networks. Moreover, 
the drift of providers to preserve and deploy the traditional 
network architecture based on independent network devices 
consist of data and forwarding planes is another obstacle 
toward expansion of SDN in carrier based networks. 
Accordingly, the focus of this research is more shifted 
toward SDN implementations in datacenters in comparison 
to the carrier networks. Nevertheless, ample cases of SDN 
based networks have been deployed [6], [7], [8], [9] in large 
datacenters and carrier networks. 
The switch communication with the controller in the 
SDN network [10] could be done through in-band or out-of-
band connections (Fig.1). The benefit of in-band communi-
cation is reduction of ports required to communicate with 
the controller, which is preferred by some providers, while 
any failure, particularly in the controller edge switch, would 
disrupt the connection with the controller and as the result 
execution of any failure recovery mechanism. Nevertheless, 
because plenty of high speed ports are available in modern 
datacenters, out-of-band communication with the controller 
is the dominant method in datacenters. 
 
 
Figure 1.  out-of-band (a) and in-band (b) controller communication 
There are various studies using probes, both active and 
passive, for network monitoring purpose [10], [11], [12], 
[13], [14], [15]. Nevertheless, active probes have several 
advantages over passive monitoring techniques [16], such as 
(i) less instrumentation (ii) capability to compute end-to-end 
performance (iii) quicker localization, etc. Furthermore, two 
major problems in probe based monitoring are probe station 
selection and probe set selection [16], [17]; the former 
addresses the problem of selecting minimum subset of 
nodes in the managed network where probe station must be 
placed such a way that best monitoring can be achieved. The 
latter defines probe set in such a way that all of elements are 
probed, minimum probe set is required for network 
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monitoring, and has better performance in bandwidth usage 
and delay. 
In respond to doubling bandwidth demand every 12-15 
months in datacenters [8], the intra-datacenter connections 
speed are started to increase from 10G to 40G recently and 
to 100G in the immediate future. However, without load 
balancing to exploit efficiently all of redundant connections 
in datacenters, few links experience congestions while other 
links are being underutilized [18], [19]. Consequently, such 
bandwidth demand cannot be fulfilled even with link speed 
growth in intra-datacenter networks. Furthermore, load 
balancing typically enables latency reduction in intra-data 
center communications. 
Having much more data at stake in the modern data 
centers, also fast failure recovery mechanisms have received 
more attention recently, avoiding result of sensitive and 
critical computations being corrupted. Generally, failure 
management mechanisms can be divided into two different 
phases, detection and restoration, each of which with its 
own implementation mechanism and execution time. 
This paper tries to investigate and provide an insight into 
deployment of an effective load balancing mechanism in 
intra-datacenter networks based on OpenFlow and the 
impacts of failures on such load balancers, although the 
results can be expanded for other types of networks. 
Regarding of failure detection, we exploit active probes 
send from each Top-of-Rack (ToR) switches and flooded by 
the aggregate switches (cluster switches) to all other ToR 
switches of same cluster (Pod). By exploiting this technique, 
all of ToR switches can perform local configuration 
modifications and act independently of central controller, 
avoiding controller saturation and scalability issue. 
The reminder of this paper is organized as below. In 
section II, we discuss related works while in section III, we 
introduce a load balancing and failure recovery scheme 
based on select groups in OpenFlow and investigate 
network behavior in the case of a failure incident. In section 
IV, we demonstrate our failure scheme exploiting active 
probes and compare it to the traditional controller based 
failure management mechanisms. Finally, we finish this 
paper with conclusion and remarks in section V. 
II. RELATED WORKS 
Lack of academic attention to failure management 
mechanisms, made the current SDN-based networks to rely 
on traditional and non-optimal algorithm and technologies 
for failure management [12]. The following is few available 
studies, worth of mentioning, about failure management in 
SDN-based networks. 
In some early works, LLDP (Link Layer Discovery 
Protocol) [20], OpenFlow events [21], and BFD (Bidirec-
tional Forwarding Detection) [22] are used to check the 
links status and inform the controller upon a failure 
occurrence in order to manage it. The results depict few 
hundreds of milliseconds are required for failure detection 
and restoration. In [23], predefined back-up paths for fast 
failure recovery are used. Without involving controller, after 
detecting failure by a switch, an automatic failure recovery 
is performed, but scalability problem due to large number of 
installed flows is observed.  
Some other works used Netography [24] to investigate 
packet behavior and pinpoint failure in the network. For 
example, in [10], [11], a two round procedure is proposed 
for in-band and out-of-band controller communications. 
First, in the Path Alive Monitoring (PAM) round, controller 
sends a monitoring packet through all links in the network. 
If the whole links are alive, the monitoring packet will 
eventually come back to the controller. If controller does not 
receive monitoring packet, a link failure is detected and the 
detection process goes to Failure Location Identification 
(FLI) round. In FLI round, controller sends an FLI packet 
through the links in the network and expects to receive a 
LFI copy forwarded by the switches in the monitoring path. 
The node which does not send a LFI copy to the controller 
is considered adjacent to the failed link. The result by 50 
msec monitoring period showed 100 msec for recovery in 
the worst case. 
In [12], a tool named SPIDER is introduced which 
consists of a stateful data plane based on OpenState [25]. In 
fact, OpenState pipeline is a legacy OpenFlow flow table 
preceded by a state table to store “flow states”. Initially, the 
controller must be provided by the backup paths and deploy 
detour paths on the switches in boot time. Furthermore, 
SPIDER uses MPLS tags to distinguish different forwarding 
behaviors to react upon failure without controller involve-
ment, and bidirectional heartbeat packets for failure 
detection. Therefore, based on the various tags, packets can 
be forwarded from detours or the default paths. However, 
incapability to differentiate between link or switch failure 
and ample flow entries per nodes, which makes the tool 
unsuitable for data center switches, are the main drawbacks 
of SPIDER. 
All of aforementioned studies do not focus on a compre-
hensive solution including both probe-based fast failure 
recovery schemes and load-balancing among equal cost 
multiple paths within data center networks. 
III. FAILURE RECOVERY IN A LOAD BALANCED 
OPENFLOW NETWORK 
Groups were introduced for the first time in OpenFlow 
1.1 [5]. The ability for a flow entry to point to a group 
enables OpenFlow to represent additional methods of 
forwarding. Each group is consisted of an ordered list of 
action buckets, where each action bucket contains a set of 
actions to execute and associated parameters. Furthermore, 
the notion of Liveness is introduced in OpenFlow 
specification; providing the OpenFlow switches with the 
capability to choose group buckets based on availability of 
other groups or ports. Nevertheless, between different group 
types, select group can be exploited for load balancing 
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purpose. According to specification of select group, packets 
are processed by a single bucket, based on a switch- 
computed selection algorithm. 
By exploiting Liveness feature incorporated in Open-
Flow groups, also known as watch group and watch port, 
OpenFlow switches are able to perform automatic failure 
recovery. As a matter of fact, if a link becomes unavailable, 
the adjacent switch automatically reroute the traffic by 
choosing another output port defined in the group. However, 
the link failure detection time is different for interfaces with 
different hardware [10], [11], and dramatically can impact 
the overall failure recovery time. 
To investigate the failure detection time of our available 
hardware and have some results to compare to outcomes of 
our final scheme, portion of a datacenter like network 
consist of equal cost multiple paths by five Open VSwitches 
[26], acting as ToR switches, and an HP 3800 switch with 
two OpenFlow instances, acting as aggregate switches, was 
deployed (Fig.2). Accordingly, several select groups, one 
for communication with each ToR switch, were installed 
through Ryu controller [27] and watch port for each bucket 
was configured.  
  
Figure 2.  Example of datacenter like network 
Furthermore, upon a link failure, all of remote ToR 
switches must be informed to avoid including the failed link 
in their communication paths. For example, in Fig.2, if the 
link connecting ToR-1 to Aggr-1 fails, other ToR switches 
(ToR-2, 3, 4, 5) must be informed to modify the group using 
to communicate with ToR-1. Initially, to inform these 
switches we involved the central controller by exploiting 
OpenFlow events which in fact are passive probes.  
In Table I, the initial results are shown. By comparing 
the results of physical failure simulation in 100M (Fast 
Ethernet) and 1G interfaces, a fast failure detection time of 
around 10ms is typically achieved for 100M interfaces. 
Instead, a longer detection time of around 350ms is 
measured for the 1G interface, which is unacceptable for 
modern datacenter deployments. Moreover, scalability 
issues may arise given the involvement of the central 
controller. 
 
 
TABLE I. INITIAL FAILURE RECOVERY SCHEME RESULTS 
NIC(Mbps) Fail Simulation Min(ms) Max(ms) Avg(ms) 
100 
Administratively 172 177 175 
Physically  4 11 7 
1000 
Administratively 170 181 176 
Physically  353 361 355 
IV. SOFTWARE BASED FAILURE RECOVERY SCHEME 
In order to shorten the failure detection phase, the most 
time consuming phase of the initial recovery scheme, we 
decided to use active probes, due to their advantages in 
comparison with passive probes. 
Furthermore, to avoid scalability issue and achieve faster 
failure recovery, the central controller is not involved in the 
proposed failure recovery scheme and group modifications 
are only performed locally by probe stations located on ToR 
switches. Generally, the goal is to diminish failure recovery 
time for 1G interfaces to less than 50ms and possibly around 
10ms.  
Before detailing the scheme, first we have to address 
two important issues of probe station selection and probe set 
selection. 
A. Probe Station Selection  
Because group modifications must be performed locally, 
each ToR switch must be contained a probe station. 
Nevertheless, locating probe stations on OpenFlow switches 
has no contradiction with the idea of SDN to use switches 
with pure forwarding plane because OpenFlow switches 
already supports probing, according to specification, and 
local group modifications can be easily performed by pre-
configured instructions set by controller on the switches.  
B. Probe Set Selection  
To have an overview of links in a cluster, all of ToR 
switches must receive probes sent by each ToR switch in the 
same cluster. For example, as shown in Fig. 3, for probe 
associated to link between ToR-1 and Aggr-1, after ToR-1 
forwards the probe packet through its associated link, Aggr-
1 floods the probe packet to ToR switches inside the cluster. 
Furthermore, to reduce the bandwidth exploited for probing, 
the probe only consist of UDP packet, and each link is 
distinguished by different UDP port number carried in the 
header. Furthermore, the overall bandwidth used by probes 
for each link must be taken into account, which varies based 
on required precision and speed of the failure detection 
phase and the number of switches inside the cluster. For 
example, if probe packets are produced every millisecond 
with 32 to 48 ToR switch in a cluster [8] and UDP packet 
size of 54 bytes, 13 to 20 Mbps of each link is occupied, 
which is negligible with respect to 10G to 40G links of 
modern intra-datacenter networks. 
Finally, the monitoring component of probe stations 
must be designed meticulously because any flaw in this 
component dramatically increases false positive or false 
negative in failure detection phase. The monitoring 
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component expects to receive at least one probe packet in a
predefined interval; if not, it assumes  the  link  is failed and 
the restoration phase begins consist of sending OpenFlow 
group modification messages. To have a better understand-
ing, consider a failure in the link connecting ToR-1 to Aggr-
1 in Fig.3. Upon the failure, all remote ToR switches (ToR-
2, 3, 4, 5) will not receive the probe packets related to the 
failed link and modify the group using to communicate with 
ToR-1. On the other hand, ToR-1 will not receive the probe 
packets, flooded by the Aggr-1 and modifies all of the 
groups using to communicate with other ToR switches in 
the cluster. 
Figure 3.  Datacenter like network consist of probe stations located on ToR switches 
However, based on our various trials and previous 
studies [10], [11], the most critical part of monitor compo-
nent is monitoring interval time. In our trials, we defined 
two different intervals, one equal to the time required to 
send two consecutive probe packets and another equal to 
three consecutive packets. As an illustration, if the rate of 
packet production is 1000pkt/sec, i.e. one packet every 
millisecond, the interval is considered 2ms in the first case 
and 3ms for the second. Nevertheless, during the failure 
simulation a high level of false positives in the failure 
detection phase was noticed in the first case, particularly in 
high link utilization, because of higher packet latency. In 
addition, even with lower probing rates but the intervals of 
equal to two consecutive packets transfer, e.g. packet rate of 
400pkt/sec and interval of 5ms, same false positives was 
spotted, although with lower rate.  
Furthermore, depending on when in monitoring interval 
link failure occurs, we expect to spend at least one and at 
most two monitoring interval for failure detection. Likewise, 
because probe stations and Open VSwitches are two 
separate modules, although both are located in the same 
machine, a short period of time is spent for exchanging 
OpenFlow messages between two modules. Because of
exchanging few  group modifications, this time for  our test 
bed is less than 1ms even for the ToR switch connected to 
the failed link which must perform the largest number of 
group modifications. However, for larger clusters with 32 to 
48 ToR switches, this time can be significant with respect to 
the short failure detection time. Nevertheless, this message 
exchange can be eliminated by integrating probe stations to 
Open VSwitches. 
In Table II, the outcomes of our final scheme are shown. 
Note that trials including false positive are not considered in 
calculation of the final results. As results depict, fast failure 
recovery time of less than 10ms is always experienced with 
probe rate of 1000pkt/sec. 
TABLE II. FAST FAILURE RECOVERY SCHEME FINAL RESULTS
Probe 
Rate(pkt/sec)
Monitoring 
interval(ms) Min(ms) Max(ms) Avg(ms)
400
5 5 11 7
7 7.2 13.4 10.5
1000
2 2.2 5.5 3.7
3 3 7 4.9
V. CONCLUSION AND REMARKS
In this paper, we delved into two indispensible 
mechanisms of any modern datacenter; first, the load 
balancing which without it datacenters cannot tackle the 
problem of increasing bandwidth demands in intra-
datacenter network, and second, the fast failure recovery 
which is vital for datacenters in order to produce consistent 
data especially in sensitive computations. Furthermore, by 
finding the failure detection phase as the most time 
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consuming phase of the initial failure recovery scheme, we 
improve our recovery mechanism with exploiting active 
probes. As final results indicate, much faster failure 
recovery time, several hundreds of milliseconds faster, is 
achieved by using the proposed scheme. Beside, because the 
central controller is not involved in the failure recovery 
procedure, no scalability issue is imposed to the controller. 
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